The Texas House of Representatives just released their fact-finding report. It’s approximately 82 pages and focuses on what could and should have been done better by both Uvalde school district, Uvalde School Police Department, and others who responded to Robb Elementary that tragic day.

It’s important to note that this is a good but not complete report. Those responsible for its completion rightly warned that “Some aspects of these interim findings may be disputed or disproven in the future.”

To be helpful, I have broken the report down into 3 segments (Overview, School Details, and Police Response). If you want to read the entire report, here is the link.

I’ve pulled out the details that I hope will be the most beneficial in planning and preparing for the next school year—both for law enforcement and school districts.

I’m not agreeing with any of the conclusion—just consolidating what the Texas House of Representatives discovered and offered as their conclusions. I will take some of these points and provide much greater details as well as recommendations that you can use to mitigate some of these shortcomings or concerns.

OVERVIEW:

1. Uvalde CISD serves a rural community of 15,217 citizens. The district’s schools include Uvalde High School, Morales Junior High, Anthon, Flores, Robb, and Dalton elementary schools, and several alternative education programs. (Page 17)
2. Robb Elementary School is for grades 3-4 and has approximately 540 students.
3. Teacher to student ratio is approximately 15:1.
4. The attack took place on 24 May 2022.
5. There was 1 attacker.
6. Prior to attacking Robb Elementary School, the 18 year old male attacker posted at approximately 11am on Facebook messenger that he was going to shoot his grandmother.
7. A few minutes later, he shot his grandmother in the face. Seeking help and to report her grandson to the police, the grandmother ran across the street to a neighbor.
8. After shooting his grandmother, the attacker posted again on Facebook to a teenage girl he had befriended online that he had shot his grandmother and that “Ima go shoot up a elementary school rn.” He did not specify a school.
9. 11:28am the attacker crashes into a ditch near the school.
10. 11:31am the attacker arrives at Robb Elementary School.
11. 11:31am an SRO drives past the attacker and mistakenly confronts a teacher, who he thought was the attacker.
12. 11:33am the attacker enters the school through an unlocked exterior door.
13. 11:35am officers arrive on scene.
14. The attacker entered rooms 111 and 112, firing approximately 149 rounds.
15. 12:50 the classroom is breached and the suspect is killed.
16. 21 were murdered (19 children and 2 adults).

SCHOOL DETAILS/SHORTCOMINGS:

1. A regrettable school culture of noncompliance by staff members.
   “…school personnel frequently propped doors open and deliberately circumvented locks. Administrators and school district police tacitly condoned this behavior as they were aware of these unsafe practices and did not treat them as serious infractions requiring immediate correction. In fact, the school actually suggested circumventing the locks as a solution for the convenience of substitute teachers and others who lacked their own keys.” (Page 10)
2. School district did not treat maintenance of doors and locks with the appropriate urgency.
   “Staff and students widely knew the door to one of the victimized classrooms, Room 111, was ordinarily unsecured and accessible. Room 111 could be locked, but an extra effort was required to make sure the latch engaged. Many knew Room 111’s door had a faulty lock, and school district police had specifically warned the teacher about it. The problem with locking the door had been reported to school administration, yet no one placed a written work order for a repair.” (Page 10)
3. Relaxed vigilance due to the frequency of security alerts and lockdowns.
   “Between February and May 2022, Robb Elementary had to lockdown approximately 50 times for ‘bailouts’ which is a term used by border communities for the increasingly frequent occurrence of human traffickers trying to outrun the police, usually ending with the smuggler crashing the vehicle and the passengers fleeing (bailout) in all directions.” (Page 10)
   
   “A school district witness also testified to another effect of the rising prevalence of bailouts. The alert system (RAPTOR) does not differentiate its signals between bailouts and other kinds of alerts, such as an active shooter situation. The series of bailout-related alerts led teachers and administrators to respond to all alerts with less urgency—when they heard the sound of an alert, many assumed that it was another bailout.” (Page 27)
4. Poor internet, poor mobile phone coverage, and inconsistent mobile phone usage which hindered the lockdown notice being received by teachers.
   If the alert had reached more teachers sooner, it is likely that more could have been done to protect them and their students. (Page 10)
5. Three exterior doors were unlocked.
   As a result the attacker had unimpeded access to the building and once inside, had unimpeded access to the adjoining rooms 111 and 112, most likely first entering room #111.
   
   “Locking the exterior and interior doors ultimately may not have been enough to stop the attacker from entering the building and classrooms. But had school personnel locked the doors as the school’s policy required, that could have slowed his progress for a few precious minutes—long enough to receive alerts, hide children, and lock doors; and long enough to give police more opportunity to engage and stop the attacker before he could massacre 19 students and two teachers.” (Page 10)
6. The attacker most likely murdered most of the innocent victims before any responder set a foot in the building.
   “Of the approximately 142 rounds the attacker fired inside the building, it is almost certain that he rapidly fired over 100 of those rounds before any officer entered.” (Page 11)

POLICE RESPONSE/SHORTCOMINGS:

1. First responders failed to adhere to their active shooter training.
   “Since the 1999 Columbine tragedy, the law enforcement community has recognized the critical importance of implementing active shooter training for all officers, regardless of specialty. Also, all officers must now acknowledge that stopping the killing of innocent lives is the highest priority in active shooter response, and all officers must be willing to risk their lives without hesitation.” (Page 11)
2. School district did not treat maintenance of doors and locks with the appropriate urgency.
   “Staff and students widely knew the door to one of the victimized classrooms, Room 111, was ordinarily unsecured and accessible. Room 111 could be locked, but an extra effort was required to make sure the latch engaged. Many knew Room 111’s door had a faulty lock, and school district police had specifically warned the teacher about it. The problem with locking the door had been reported to school administration, yet no one placed a written work order for a repair.” (Page 10)
3. Despite the immediate presence of police leaders, there was an unacceptably long period of time before officers breached the classroom, neutralized the attacker, and began rescue efforts.
   The first wave of responders included the chief of police and the commander of the Uvalde Police Department SWAT team.
   
   “We do not know at this time whether responders could have saved more lives by shortening that delay. Regardless, law enforcement committed numerous mistakes in violation of current active shooter training, and there are important lessons to be learned from each faulty assumption and poor decision made that day.” (Page 11)
4. Chief of police (Uvalde Central School District) failed to perform or to transfer role of incident commander.
   “The void of leadership could have contributed to the loss of life as injured victims waited over an hour for help, and the attacker continued to sporadically fire his weapon.” (Page 11)
5. Failure of communication and the relaying of key information.
   “Nobody ensured that responders making key decisions inside the building received information that students and teachers had survived the initial burst of gunfire, were trapped in Rooms 111 and 112, and had called out for help. Some responders outside and inside the building knew that information through radio communications. But nobody in command analyzed this information to recognize that the attacker was preventing critically injured victims from obtaining medical care.” (Page 12)
6. Precious time wasted searching for keys and shields instead of prioritizing the rescue of innocent victims.
   “Instead of continuing to act as if they were addressing a barricaded subject scenario in which responders had time on their side, they should have reassessed the scenario as one involving an active shooter.” (Page 12)
   
   “An offsite overall incident commander who properly categorized the crisis as an active shooter scenario should have urged using other secondary means to breach the classroom, such as using a sledgehammer as suggested in active shooter training or entering through the exterior windows.” (Page 12)
7. Radios were mostly ineffective.
   Responders needed other lines of communication to communicate important information like the victims’ phone calls from inside the classrooms. (Page 12)
8. Uvalde CISD police department failed to implement their active shooter plan and failed to exercise command and control of law enforcement responding to the tragedy. (Page 12)
9. Someone else should have taken command or supplied leadership.
   “Hundreds of responders from numerous law enforcement agencies—many of whom were better trained and better equipped than the school district police—quickly arrived on the scene. Those other responders, who also had received training on active shooter response and the interrelation of law enforcement agencies, could have helped to address the unfolding chaos. Yet in this crisis, no responder seized the initiative to establish an incident command post. Despite an obvious atmosphere of chaos, the ranking officers of other responding agencies did not approach the Uvalde CISD chief of police or anyone else perceived to be in command to point out the lack of and need for a command post, or to offer that specific assistance…in this sense, the entirety of law enforcement and its training, preparation, and response shares systemic responsibility for many missed opportunities on that tragic day. (Page 12 - 13)

Last and perhaps the most important point.

If you’ve been doing this for a bit you’ll see that everything labeled as a shortcoming or as a failed opportunity to prevent violence is nothing new. We know what we need to do, how it needs to be done, and why it’s so critical that we do the right thing at the right time.

It’s unfair to say that this is a wake up call. Schools and police departments know what’s at stake and are doing a fantastic job and only getting better! This report however is a stark reminder of the importance of doing the little things like locking doors and adhering to your training. Failing to do these will profoundly impact your ability to prevent, delay, or minimize a potentially tragic event.

Give yourself and your school a chance to be successful—lock your doors and follow your training!

---------------------------------------------

If you’d like to prepare and inspire your teachers, consider scheduling a Safe & Loved teacher professional development. We still have some dates available for the start of the 2022-2023 school year.

Presentations can be 3-8 hours long and fit perfectly into in-service training.

email for more details.

Click here here for more blogs from Don